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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC. V. CHRISTENSEN: A CLASS
ACTION CLAIM CAN TOLL THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL, UNNAMED MEMBERS
OF THE CLASS AS LONG AS THE DEFENDANT IS
PROVIDED WITH SUFFICIENT NOTICE.
By: Andrew Burnett
In a matter of first impression, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that a class action claim can toll the statute of limitations for
individual unnamed members of the class as long as the defendant is
Philip Morris USA, Inc. v.
provided with sufficient notice.
Christensen, 394 Md. 227, 905 A.2d 340 (2006). More specifically,
the defendant must have notice of the "substantive claims" asserted
against them, as well as the number and "generic identities" of
possible plaintiffs. Id. at 256, 905 A.2d at 357. The second issue the
Court addressed is whether granting summary judgment was
appropriate for petitioner.
On August 13, 2001, Nona Christensen ("Ms. Christensen") in her
capacity as the representative of her deceased husband, Russell
Christensen ("Mr. Christensen"), brought a survival and wrongful
death action against Philip Morris USA, Inc. ("Philip Morris") and
other manufacturers of cigarette products. The action was also
brought against Giant Food, LLC ("Giant") and others involved in the
distribution and sale of cigarette products. With the exception of
Giant, the defendants in the case at bar, ("petitioners"), were in a prior
class action suit filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.
Christensen, 394 Md. at 232, 905 A.2d at 343 (citing Philip Morris
USA, Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 752 A.2d 200 (2000)).
The claims against the petitioners in the class action were asserted
on behalf of all Maryland residents who suffered from physical
injuries or disease caused by tobacco products, and who pled nicotine
addiction as their injury. Although Mr. Christensen was not a named
plaintiff, he did provide an affidavit on behalf of the named plaintiffs,
discussing his smoking habit and his lung cancer. The circuit court
issued a Class Certification Order, but the Court of Appeals of
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Maryland, on June 15, 2000, issued a writ of mandamus directing the
circuit court to vacate its Class Certification Order.
As a result, Ms. Christensen filed the action at issue here on behalf
of her husband. On September 4, 2003, petitioners moved for
summary judgment arguing that all of Ms. Christensen's claims were
barred by the statute of limitations. The circuit court granted the
motion, rejecting the argument that the statute of limitations was tolled
by the pendency of the Philip Morris class action. The Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland reversed the judgment as to all
petitioners except Giant, which was remanded to determine when Mr.
Christensen was put on inquiry notice of his claims against Giant and
whether summary judgment would be proper. Philip Morris petitioned
the Court of Appeals of Maryland for a writ of certiorari, which was
granted.
Upon granting certiorari, the Court considered two issues. First, in
a matter of first impression, the Court sought to determine whether the
statute of limitations for the filing of individual suits is tolled by the
pendency of a class action. Christensen, 394 Md. at 231, 905 A.2d at
341.
In rejecting petitioner's argument that the Court's precedent
precluded judicial recognition of a tolling exception such as those
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in American Pipe &
Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 94 S.Ct. 756 (1974), the
Court of Appeals of Maryland pointed to Bertonazzi v. Hillman, 241
Md. 361, 216 A.2d 723 (1966). Christensen, 394 Md. at 235-37, 905
A.2d at 345-46. In Bertonazzi, the Court determined the pendency of
an action filed in an incorrect venue tolled the statute of limitations for
claims against a decedent's estate. Christensen, 394 Md. at 236, 905
A.2d at 345. The Court in Bertonazzi stated that even though time
would be extended, the purpose of the statute of limitations was still
being served. Christensen, 394 Md. at 238, 905 A.2d at 346-47.
Defendants would still be assured that claims asserted after evidence
had disappeared would be unjust. [d.
The Court in Bertonazzi went on to note that two conditions must
be satisfied to toll the statute of limitations. Christensen, 394 Md. at
238, 905 A.2d at 347. First, there must be persuasive authority or
policy considerations supporting the tolling exception. [d. Second,
the tolling exception is consistent with the purposes of statutes of
limitations. [d. Although the Court of Appeals of Maryland has
previously analyzed cases under the Bertonazzi two-part test, the Court
in the instant case sought to clarify the circumstances under which a
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tolling exception would be applicable. Christensen, 394 Md. 227, 905
A.2d 340.
When a Maryland rule is patterned after a federal rule, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland has always found federal case law persuasive.
[d. at 253, 905 A.2d at 355-56. In particular, Maryland Rule 2-231 is
modeled after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Christensen, 394
Md. at 253, 905 A.2d at 356. As such, the Court found the reasoning
in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 94 S. Ct.
756 (1974) particularly persuasive. Christensen, 394 Md. at 253, 905
A.2d at 356.
In American Pipe, the United States Supreme Court held that the
statute of limitations was tolled by the pendency of the putative class
action and the statute of limitations does not resume until class
certification is denied. Christensen, 394 Md. at 253, 905 A.2d at 356
(citing American Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 94 S.Ct.
756 (1974)). The Court reasoned tolling was necessary in order to
promote judicial efficiency and economy. Christensen, 394 Md. at
253-54, 905 A.2d at 356. The tolling exception protects individuals
involved in class action claims and eliminates the need to file
separately. [d. However, American Pipe pertained to members of a
putative class who were making motions to intervene after class
certification was denied. Christensen, 394 Md. at 248, 905 A.2d at
354. This is different than the case at bar which involves a subsequent
claim by Ms. Christensen as an individual member and not as an
intervener. [d.
As such, the Court in the case at hand also relied on Crown, Cork &
Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 103 S.Ct. 2392 (1983). Christensen,
394 Md. at 249, 905 A.2d at 353. The Court in Crown, Cork & Seal,
held that the statute of limitations is tolled for the individual claims of
class members in the same way the tolling in American Pipe applied
for intervenors. Christensen, 394 Md. at 254-55, 905 A.2d at 356-57.
Refusing to extend the rule to individual members could shorten the
time a class member has to file an action if certification is denied,
whereby claimants are left without an action in which to intervene. [d.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland went beyond the requirements
set forth in American Pipe, and held that a plaintiff must demonstrate
that the defendants are notified of "not only the substantive claims
being brought, but also of the number and generic identities of the
potential plaintiffs." Christensen, 394 Md. at 256, 905 A.2d at 357
(citing American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 555, 94 S.Ct. at 767). The Court
emphasized that to benefit from class action tolling, the individual suit
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must "concern the same evidence, memories, and witnesses as the
subject matter of the original class suit." Christensen, 394 Md. at 256,
905 A.2d at 357 (quoting American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 562, 94 S.Ct. at
770 (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
Petitioners argued that even if the Court recognizes a tolling
exception in class action suits, it should, based on a lack of
commonality, make an exception for causes of action arising out of a
"mass-tort" incident. Christensen, 394 Md. at 257, 905 A.2d at 35859. However, the Court rejected this argument by noting that a lack of
commonality does not necessarily mean the defendant had a lack of
notice of the substantive claims of every putative class member. [d.
Therefore, the Court stated there is no reason to have a per se
exception for mass-tort cases. [d.
The only further question to be decided was whether Philip Morris
received adequate notice of Ms. Christensen's claims. [d. at 266, 905
A.2d at 363. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the
petitioners had adequate notice because the class action complaint
defined the plaintiff class as "all Maryland residents who have
suffered or continue to suffer from physical injuries or disease caused
by smoking cigarettes or using smokeless tobacco ... " Christensen,
394 Md. at 266, 905 A.2d at 364 (quoting Philip Morris, 358 Md. at
700, 752 A.2d at 206). Therefore, because Mr. Christensen also
provided an affidavit and testified at a deposition regarding his history
of smoking and lung cancer, "there was no question" that Philip
Morris had adequate notice of his claims. Christensen, 394 Md. at
266, 905 A.2d at 364.
The second issue the Court addressed is whether the circuit court
was correct when it granted summary judgment in favor of Giant. [d.
at 268, 905 A.2d at 365. Giant was not a defendant in the class action
against Philip Morris, and therefore, class action tolling was not
applicable. [d. at 268, 905 A.2d at 356. However, there is a dispute
between the parties regarding the timing of Mr. Christensen's cause of
action arising from his lung cancer. [d. Accordingly, the Court
remanded the issue to the circuit court for reconsideration in light of
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Benjamin, 394 Md. 59,904 A.2d 511 (2006).
[d. at 269, 905 A.2d at 364. The Court in Georgia-Pacific held, with
respect to asbestos, a claimant should have knowledge of a claim when
he has been diagnosed with mesothelioma and the claimant has
knowledge of exposure to asbestos. Christensen, 394 Md. at 269, 905
A.2d at 365.
As such, the trial court will have to make factual
determinations consistent with these factors to determine if Ms.
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Christensen has a cause of action against Giant arising from Mr.
Christensen's use of tobacco products. [d.
Maryland courts now recognize the pendency of a class action suit
will toll the statute of limitations for putative class members so long as
the claims are the same and the defendant has adequate notice of the
putative class member who is benefiting from the tolling exception.
Therefore, if class certification is denied, individual members may
bring a separate action without being barred by the statute of
limitations, so long as the claim is timely filed after the denial of
certification.

